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Connecticut may finally have a budget 
by the time this issue goes to press, 
but  we’re  not  holding  our  breath.   
Governor Rell and the legislature are 
locked  in  a  debate  about  whether 
to cut programs or raise taxes.  but 
even  a  prolonged  budget  crisis  may 
have  an  upside  if  it  forces  officials 
to scrutinize spending and taxes and 
perhaps  improve  the  mix  of  both.   
Unfortunately,  spending  cuts  often 
incur the wrath of special interests, 
and our analysis here suggests that 
policymakers may not have much wig-
gle room to close the budget gap by 
tinkering with the tax mix.  
	 If	nothing	else,	all	this	fiscal	soul-
searching	raises	some	interesting	ques-
tions.	 	 Is	 it	 fair,	 wise,	 or	 politically	
prudent	to	raise	taxes	on	high-income	





tive	 sales	 taxes	 on	 smoking	 or	 other	
socially	harmful	behaviors?		But	if	such	
questions	 had	 simple	 answers,	 we’d	
have	a	budget	by	now.
	 Whatever	the	optimal	mix	of	taxes	







worth	 considering	 how	 various	 tax	
mixes	affect	government	revenues.
	
MODElING ThE TAx TAkE 
	 The	forms	and	functions	of	gov-
ernment	vary	by	state,	making	tax	or	
spending	 comparisons	 a	 bit	 compli-
cated.		The	absence	of	county	govern-
ments	 in	 New	 England	 states	 makes	
comparisons	with	other	states	difficult.	 	
Lacking	 that	 additional	 county	 layer,	
Connecticut	pushes	some	responsibili-
ties	“up”	to	the	state	level,	while	push-
ing	 others	 “down”	 to	 municipalities.	 	
Consequently,	 both	 state	 and	 local	







and	 municipal	 government	 activities	
within	 a	 state	 into	 a	 single	 category.	 	




	 In	 any	 year,	 non-federal	 tax	 rev-
enue	 per	 capita	 varies	 considerably	
across	states.		In	fiscal	year	2006	(FY06,	
for	 short),	 it	 ranged	 from	 $2,782	 in	
Alabama	to	$6,413	in	New	York.		The	
scatter	 plot	 suggests	 that	 much	 of	
the	 difference	 is	 driven	 by	 income:	
per	capita	income	alone	explains	2/3	

















Bureau	 data	 on	 non-federal	 revenues	
for	 all	 50	 states	 over	 12	 fiscal	 years,	
from	 FY93	 through	 FY06	 (data	 for	
FY01	 and	 FY03	 were	 unavailable).	 	
The	explanatory	variables	used	in	our	
multiple	 regression	 analysis	 included	
some	obvious	ones	like	personal	income	
per	capita,	state	land	area	(acres)	per	






	 The	 tax	 shares	 always	 sum	 to	
100%,	so	we	had	to	omit	one	share	








share,	 since	 the	 other	 shares	 in	 the	
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SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, based on data from  
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regression	 are	 statistically	 “held	 con-
stant.”			We	therefore	ran	six	regres-
sions,	 omitting	 a	 different	 share	 in	
each,	 to	 obtain	 the	 full	 range	 of	 net	
effects	 showing	 how	 an	 increase	 in	
each	share	affects	revenue	per	capita,	
depending	 on	 which	 other	 (omitted)	
share	is	reduced.	






an	 increase	 in	 Connecticut’s	 general	
sales	tax	rate	could	raise	or	lower	rev-














of	 non-federal	 taxes	 per	 head,	 across	
states	and	over	time,	we	also	allowed	
for	 state-level	 differences	 and	 time-
period	 differences	 by	 including	 49	
state-specific	 indicator	 or	 “dummy”	





PATTERNS AND RESUlTS 
	 Over	 the	 study	 period,	
Connecticut’s	 non-federal	 tax	 shares	
were	relatively	stable.	The	brief	reces-
sion	 of	 2001	 brought	 a	 lower	 share	
of	 tax	 revenue	 from	 individual	 and	
corporate	income	taxes,	and	somewhat	
greater	reliance	on	property	taxes,	but	





	 The	 bar	 graph	 also	 shows	 that	
Connecticut’s	 tax	 mix	 is	 more	 like	





verge.	 	 Compared	 with	 the	 50-state	
averages,	 Connecticut	 and	 its	 neigh-
bors	rely	more	on	property	taxes	and	
individual	 income	 taxes,	 and	 less	 on	
both	kinds	of	sales	taxes	and	the	resid-









should	 be	 emphasized	 that	 these	 are	
revenue	 shares,	 reflecting	 the	 mix	 of	
taxes,	 as	 opposed	 to	 tax	 rates.	 	 New	
York’s	 larger	 corporate	 tax	 share,	 for	
instance,	could	just	reflect	the	presence	
of	 a	 larger	 corporate	 tax	 base,	 rather	
than	a	higher	tax	rate.
	 The	key	results	of	the	six	panel-
regression	 analyses	 are	 shown	 in	 the	
table,	but	first	let’s	look	at	some	results	
that	are	common	to	all	the	regressions.	






















The most intriguing 
finding is the apparent 
lack of opportunities to 
substantially boost 
non-federal tax revenue 
by changing the tax mix.
HOW DO WE COMPARE?
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SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, based on U.S. Census 
Bureau data for Fy06.
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significant,	but	they	still	help	to	con-
trol	 for	 general	 economic	 conditions	
that	vary	over	time	and	may	affect	all	
states.		
	 The	 table	 summarizes	 the	 main	
results	for	the	tax	share	variables	from	
each	of	the	six	regressions.		Again,	each	
share	 coefficient	 shows	 the	 estimated	
net	effect—the	dollar	change	in	non-
federal	 tax	 revenue	 per	 person—of	
increasing	 that	 share	 by	 a	 percent-
age	 point	 and	 reducing	 the	 omitted	
share	by	one	point.		For	example,	the	
first	row	indicates	that,	after	control-
ling	 for	 the	 factors	 described	 above,	











similar	 manner,	 but	 only	 coefficients	



























statistically	 significant;	 these	 policy	
“plums”	are	highlighted	in	red.		Shifts	




from	 property	 taxes	 ($11.90),	 would	
tend	 to	 increase	 non-federal	 revenue	
per	person.		But	by	far	the	largest	per	
capita	gains	come	from	shifts	toward	
the	 nebulous	 “all	 other	 taxes”	 (e.g.,	
license	fees;	estate	or	gift	taxes;	or	taxes	




significant	 (p	 <	 0.001).	 	 However,	





avoid	 the	 wrath	 of	 vocal,	 politically	
active,	or	well-heeled	groups.
AT ThE PEAk 
	 The	 most	 intriguing	 feature	
of	 the	 table	 is	 the	 apparent	 lack	 of	
opportunities	 to	 substantially	 boost	
non-federal	 tax	 revenue	 by	 changing	
the	 tax	 mix.	 	 The	 larger	 “targets	 of	
opportunity”	involve	raising	politically	
unpopular	selective	taxes	or	alienating	
special	 interests.	 	 Many	 of	 the	 other	
coefficients	 are	 quite	 small	 or	 sta-




















SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, based on based on panel-data regression analysis of Census Bureau data for all 50 states over 
12 fiscal years. 
Estimated coefficents are expressed as dollars per capita.  Figures in parentheses are p-values. A p-value is the chance of finding such an 
extreme value for the coefficient, if in fact no relationship actually exiists between the dependent and independent variable.  The smaller 
the p-value, the more statistically significant the result. 
…If reduction is made in share of taxes from:
property general  selective individual corporate all other
taxes sales sales  income income taxes
property 0 -3.20 -14.24 -11.90 -8.31 -43.11
taxes (0.516) (0.018) (0.027) (0.303) (0.000)
general  3.20 0 -11.04 -8.70 -5.11 -39.91
sales (0.516) (0.097) (0.146) (0.565) (0.000)
selective 14.24 11.04 0 2.34 5.93 -28.87
sales (0.018) (0.097) (0.729) (0.478) (0.000)
individual 11.90 8.70 -2.34 0 3.60 -31.20
income (0.027) (0.146) (0.729) (0.695) (0.000)
corporate 8.31 5.11 -5.93 -3.60 0 -34.79
income (0.303) (0.565) (0.478) (0.695) (0.000)
all other 43.11 39.91 28.87 31.20 34.79 0
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